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BOOK REVIEWS

A History of Gaming
McHugh, Francis J. Fundamentals of War Gaming. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2012. 238pp.
$40

War gaming is part of the Naval War
College’s storied past. Then as now an
integral part of the College’s curriculum,
throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, gaming provided the Naval War
College’s faculty and students an opportunity to examine various courses of
action and operational plans that would
later be put to use in the Second World
War. Many observers have noted that the
games conducted at the College were important to the successful outcome of the
war in the Pacific against Japan. Frank
McHugh’s Fundamentals of War Gaming
explains the techniques and procedures
that the Naval War College developed
and utilized in the games of those years.
McHugh’s half-century with the War
Gaming Department began in 1934,
precisely the time when the College
faculty was testing and evaluating various contingency plans for the expected
conflict with Japan. McHugh planned
and participated in games, later he
served as an analyst, and in 1957 he
helped to deploy the Naval Electronic
Warfare Simulator. He was known both
nationally and internationally for his lectures on gaming techniques. In this work
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McHugh does not present a general
thesis examining gaming’s effectiveness,
value, or importance. Rather the book
describes in detail the technical aspects
of gaming, with chapters outlining
various gaming techniques and procedures. McHugh provides a thorough
overview of all aspects of war gaming
that the Naval War College employed in
the first half of the twentieth century.
The first chapter provides an introduction to war games, explaining the types
of games most likely to be employed
and the roles of the players, participants,
and observers. This is followed by a
chapter on the history of gaming, from
its beginnings in the Prussian military.
McHugh gives the reader a thumbnail
sketch of gaming as it developed in the
nineteenth century and was eventually
adopted by most major combatants prior
to World War II. He explains that the
U.S. military adopted war gaming as a
tool to examine emerging doctrine at the
service colleges. It was not just the Navy
that integrated war games into its service
school curriculum but the Army and the
Army Air Corps as well. Following the
chapter on the history of games, which
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comprises about seventy pages, McHugh
presents four chapters that delve into
the mechanics and details of how games
were organized and conducted. The concluding chapter introduces the reader to
the computer system that revolutionized
naval gaming in the late 1950s (since
replaced by successive generations of
more sophisticated machinery). Four
appendixes provide greater detail on
determining chance and probability, as
well as a glossary of war-gaming terms.
However, no index is included. Not necessarily geared toward a general reading
audience, Fundamentals of War Gaming
delivers a technically oriented wargaming operator an essential handbook
on the history and importance of the
craft. It is a user’s guide, and some of the
techniques and methodologies for planning, executing, adjudicating, and analyzing war games are still in use today.
This is a reprint of the third edition of
McHugh’s book, which was originally
published in 1966. If there is an heir to
Frank McHugh—a nationally recognized gaming expert with the expertise
that once set McHugh apart from his
peers—perhaps he or she would consider updating the text by bringing the
reader into the twenty-first century. This
is a potential avenue for further inquiry,
one that would be of great interest to
those looking to what the future holds
for the profession of gaming, or to the
relationship in the twenty-first century
between war games and curriculum at
service schools. This additional insight
would provide enough material for a
useful fourth edition. However, as it
stands, McHugh’s book chronicles the
history of gaming and describes the
various techniques, procedures, and
parameters employed by war gamers
throughout the first half of the twentieth
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century. It is an interesting and useful
book, one that I highly recommend.
Jeff Shaw

Naval War College

Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor.
The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for
Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. New
York: Pantheon, 2012. 800pp. $35

At the end of Cobra II: The Inside Story
of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
(2007), Michael Gordon and Bernard
Trainor concluded that Americans and
Iraqis had created an Iraq of “chaos,
suffering, and a future that is still
vexed.” Six years later that vexed future
is realized in their latest book, The
Endgame. Thoroughly researched, this
book leverages not only documentary
sources but interviews with American and Iraqi leaders who shaped the
post-Saddam Iraq to give the most
encompassing narrative to date of the
U.S. occupation of Iraq. Nearly eight
hundred pages in length, this is the best
single-volume study of the American
and Iraqi experiences in postinvasion
Iraq from 2003 to the U.S. withdrawal
in 2011. Any future histories of the
Iraqi war will have to acknowledge this
comprehensive research and account.
After retracing some territory familiar
from Cobra II, Gordon and Trainor pre
sent a detailed account of the American
occupation and effort to create a new
Iraq. What becomes clear in this volume
is that President George W. Bush, his
administration, and the first team of
military leaders failed to create an adequate policy and strategy to transform
the fractious Iraqi people into a stable
nation. Sectarian violence, internal
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